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Epistemological Proof of Gödel’s Conception of the Realistic Nature of Mathematical Theories and the 
Impossibility of Proving Their Incompleteness Formally   
  
 Dan Nesher, Department of Philosophy University of Haifa, Israel 
 
No calculus can decide a philosophical problem. A calculus cannot give us information about the 
foundations of mathematics. (Wittgenstein, 1933-34: 296) 
 
1.  Introduction: Pragmaticist Epistemological Proof of Gödel’s Insight of the Realistic Nature of 
Mathematical Theories and the Impossibility of Proving Their Incompleteness Formally 
 In this article, I attempt a pragmaticist epistemological proof of Gödel’s conception of the realistic 
nature of mathematical theories representing facts of their external reality. Gödel generated a realistic 
revolution in the foundations of mathematics by attempting to prove formally the distinction between 
complete formal systems and incomplete mathematical theories.  According to Gödel’s Platonism, 
mathematical reality consists of eternal true ideal facts that we can grasp with our mathematical intuition, an 
analogue of our sensual perception of physical facts.  Moreover, mathematical facts force us to accept 
intuitively mathematical true axioms, which are analogues of physical laws of nature, and through such 
intuition we evaluate the inferred theorems upon newly grasped mathematical facts. However, grasping ideal 
abstractions by means of such mysterious pure intuitions is beyond human cognitive capacity. Employing 
pragmaticist epistemology, I will show that formal systems are only radical abstractions of human cognitive 
operations and therefore cannot explain how we represent external reality. Moreover, in formal systems we 
cannot prove the truth of their axioms but only assume it dogmatically, and their inferred theorems are 
logically isolated from external reality. Therefore, if Gödel’s incompleteness of mathematical theories holds, 
then we cannot know the truth of the basic mathematical facts of reality by means of any formal proofs.  
Hence Gödel’s formal proof of the incompleteness of mathematics cannot hold since the truth of basic facts of 
mathematical reality cannot be proved formally and thus his unprovable theorem cannot be true.  However, 
Gödel separates the truth of mathematical facts from mathematical proof by assuming that mathematical facts 
are eternally true and thus, the unprovable theorem seems to be true.  Pragmatistically, realistic theories 
represent external reality, not by formal logic and not the abstract reality, but by the epistemic logic of the 
complete proof of our perceptual propositions of facts and realistic theories.  Accordingly, it can be explained 
how all our knowledge starts from our perceptual confrontation with reality without assuming any a priori or 
“given” knowledge. Hence, mathematics is also an empirical science; however, its represented reality is 
neither that of ideal objects nor that of physical objects but our operations of counting and measuring physical 
objects which we perceptually quasi-prove true as mathematical basic facts (Nesher, 2002: V, X). 
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2.  Gödel’s Platonism and the Conception of Mathematical Reality with Its True Conceptual Facts  
 Gödel’s basic insight of the realistic nature of mathematics that it is a science represents mathematical 
reality and not just a conventional formal system. Yet, Gödel's Platonist mathematics is an abstract science 
representing ideal true mathematical reality though analogical to the empirical sciences (Gödel, 1944).  As a 
metaphysical realist, Gödel separates the mathematical reality of abstract true facts from formal proofs, and it 
is only by pure intuition that we can grasp these facts.  Figure 1 presents a schema of Gödel’s different 
conceptions of logic and mathematics: 
 
 [1] The Gödelian Epistemology of Three Conceptions of Logic and Mathematics:  
 
         A      B        C 
      Russell- Principia   
      Wittgenstein-Logic:  Tractatus              Frege, Hilbert,         Gödel-Platonism: Conceptual Realism 
         Carnap-Syntax         Wittgenstein-Language: Tractatus      of Scientific Mathematical Theories 
           [(Tautological)       (Analytical)                 (Realistic)]:   Gdel:1951 
              Axiomatic               Axiomatic                            Theories: 
             Syntactical                     Semantical          Platonistic Realism,  
          Formal System                        Formal System                  or Empirical Realism 
            and Its language  
                                      /|\ Representing reality 
Miraculously Assumed/|\         Miraculously Assumed   /|\                The Axioms   ///\\\  
     Set of Axioms     /||||||\    Set of Axioms /||||||\              / ////\\\\\  
    /|||||||||||\                  / |||||||||||\            /     |      \ 
Rules of Inferences /     |      \           Rules of Inferences   /     |      \           Rules of Proofs    /Deductive\ 
(As Proofs)           /Deduction\              (As Proofs)         /Deduction\                       /  Consistent \ 
             /         |          \          /   |           \                                       /     Inference   \                         
             /__________\          /____ ____ _\            Intuitive         /                        \        Intuitive Evaluation 
         /         T h e  \           Inference      /                          \      of Conclusions Upon 
       No External Reality         /   Conclusions         \           of Axioms   /  The Conclusions   \    Mathematical Facts 
         Simile-Reality    |       Assigned            |                            
         Isolated from     |    Interpretation of    |      Intuitively    ____________________ 
       External Reality |    Intended Model     |                Grasped       /  P r o s i t i o n a l F a c t \ 
           (Weyl, 1925)                       /         \ 
           (Zach, 2003)          Representation       / Mathematical         \  
                                     (Hintikka, 2005)          /       EXTERNAL REALITY      \  
  
 Gödel’s tri-partitions are between (A) Complete Analytic Formal Systems with their formal syntactic 
tautologies, (B) Complete Formal Semantic analyses, and (C) the Incomplete Realistic Theories of conceptual 
mathematics (Gödel, 1951: 319-323; Poincaré, 1902: Chap. I).   
  
The two significations of the term analytic might perhaps be distinguished as tautological and analytic 
(Gödel, 1944:139, n. 46). 
 Epistemologically the tautological and analytic of complete formal systems are, respectively, 
syntactically closed upon their fixed axioms and formal rules of inference and semantically closed upon 
axioms, formal rules, and the assigned model. The realist incomplete theory is only relatively closed upon 
its relative proof-conditions, the formal proofs, the operations of pure intuition, and conceptual facts of 
external reality (Nesher, 2002: X).  Since Gödel’s mathematical theories are regarded as axiomatic formal 
systems with formal inferences, yet their external reality can be grasped only by pure intuition (Gödel, 
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1931a: 203, 1964: 268).  
For Gödel, pure mathematical intuition has three functions: (1) to grasp the true ideal mathematical 
facts of mathematical reality, (2) to enforce by these ideal facts to accept the true axioms of mathematical 
theories in order to infer the theorems formally, and (3) to evaluate how the theorems represent truly facts 
of mathematical reality (Gödel, 1953-54?: fn. 34; Nesher, 2001a, 2010). Gödel’s conception of 
mathematical intuition is based on his mathematical experience, which he calls the “psychological fact of 
the existence of an intuition,” but as a “given” without any explanation. 
  
However, the question of the objects of mathematical intuition (which incidentally is a replica of 
the question of the objective existence of the outer world) is not decisive for the problem under 
discussion here. The mere psychological fact of the existence of an intuition which is sufficiently 
clear to produce the axioms of set theory and an open series of extensions of them suffices to give 
meaning to the question of the truth or falsity of propositions like Cantor’s continuum hypothesis 
(Gödel, 1964: 268).  
 
How with mathematical intuition we grasp pure meanings of mathematical propositions is the 
essential problem to the possibility of Gödel's conceptual realism (Gödel, 164:268). 
  
3.   Gödel’s Incomplete Distinction between Formal Systems and Realistic Theories  
 Gödel revolutionized the conception of the nature of mathematics through his distinction between 
complete logical formal systems and incomplete mathematical theories (Gödel, 1931:195, 1964). However, 
he did not conclude this revolution, because of his acceptance the formalist methods of mathematical 
proofs and the subjective conception of pure intuition owing to his Platonist realism that motivated this 
revolution (Gödel, 1931:#1).  
 
[2] Epistemological Gap between Logical Formal Systems and Mathematical Theories 
 
              Realist Theory 
     Formal System       representing reality   
  and its language          /|\ 
        Miraculously Assumed   /|\        The Axioms   ///\\\  
          Set of Axioms /|||||||\       /////\\\\\  
             /|||||||||||||\     /     |       \ 
          Rules of Inferences   /     |        \               /Deductive \ 
   (As Proofs)       /Deducting                  /    Formal     \ 
       /   |   \                           /     Inference     \                         
                           /__________ \                   /                        \      
              /         T h e      \    Axioms force   /                   \     
                                  /   Conclusions         \ themselves /    The Conclusions      \      The conclusions 
      Quasi-Reality     |       Assigned            |   Intuitively   _____________________       Evaluated     
     Isolated from     |   Interpretation in     |                    / Intuitively Grasped         \     Intuitively 
   External Reality  |   Intended Model     |        /  P r o s i t i o n a l  F a c t      \ 
                      / External Conceptual Reality \                                 
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 The difference between formal system and realist theory lies in their proof-conditions when the 
formal system is by definition hermetically closed upon its fixed formal proof-conditions without relation 
to external reality; the mathematical realistic theory is relatively closed upon its proof-conditions: the 
mathematical facts of external reality, the formal inferences, and the pure intuitions that complete the 
representation of reality, while the axioms change by our continually grasping new mathematical facts. 
Yet, the formal systems are artificially abstracted from human mathematical operations and cannot explain 
them, and thus they can never be “ideal machines” by lacking any human cognitive self-consciousness and 
self-controlled operations upon reality (Gödel, 1931: 195 & n. 70; 1951: 310; Feferman, 2006; Putnam, 
2011; Penrose, 2011). Apparently Gödel did not completely conceive his epistemological revolution of the 
realistic nature of mathematics and considered the three classes of logico-mathematics, A, B, and C, as 
formal systems, while neglecting the essential distinction between formal systems and mathematical 
theories. 
 
The development of mathematics toward greater precision has led, as is well known, to the 
formalization of large tracts of it, so that one can prove any theorem using nothing but a few 
mechanical rules. The most comprehensive formal systems that have been set up hitherto are the 
system of Principia mathematica (PM) on the one hand and the Zermelo-Frankel axiom system of 
set theory  . . .  on the other. These two systems are so comprehensive that in them all methods of 
proof today used in mathematics are formalized, that is, reduced to a few axioms and rules of 
inference. (Gödel, 1931: #1; cf. 1931a; Kleene, 1967: 253) 
 
 Gödel’s incompleteness theorem essentially shows that PM and ZF are mathematical theories, not 
formal systems; however, since they use formal inferences, then without the help of mathematicians' 
conceptual intuition, those systems are isolated from mathematical reality.  According to pragmaticist 
epistemology, the formal inference is only one component of the epistemic logic which includes also the 
Abductive and Inductive material inferences of the complete proof enable also to prove the basic 
mathematical facts of external reality. Yet, even after proving the incompleteness of mathematics, Gödel 
still oscillated between mathematics as axiomatic formal systems and as scientific theories, and thus he 
could not complete his realistic revolution of mathematics (Gödel, 1953-54? II; Feferman, 1984: 9-11). 
4.  Gödel’s Paradoxical Formal Proof of Incompleteness, Based on Separating Truth from Its Proof 
 If Gödel’s incompleteness holds, then mathematics is theory and a not formal system so, can Gödel 
prove formally his incompleteness in mathematical theory that cannot prove formally true theorems 
(Hintikka, 2000: V)? Gödel’s formal proof of incompleteness is actually an “arithmetization of syntax,” 
which attempts to prove his epistemological conception of the nature of mathematics. But Gödel’s 
incompleteness is a general claim that can be proved only epistemologically, and not through any specific 
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theory about itself. It could be that in respect of a special mathematical theorem it can be prove that a 
specific theory (e.g., PM or ZF) is incomplete in respect to specific propositions and the given true 
mathematical facts; but it cannot provide a general proof of the nature of mathematics (Gödel, 1944:121).   
Gödel arithmeticized the proof of the undecided proposition G1: “I am unprovable,” by means of a 
metamathematical description in order to prove this unprovable mathematical proposition, “We therefore 
have before us a proposition that says about itself that it is not provable [in PM]” (Gödel, 1931: 151).  The 
question is whether this formal proof can be considered proof of G1: “I am unprovable”?  There are two 
problems here: (1) Can at all there be metalanguages, since meta-descriptions of mathematical languages 
can , at most, describe physical-syntactical signs, following Tarski, and not their meaning-contents, which 
we can only interpret, yet not in abstract models but in respect to experience (Wittgenstein, 1921, 1933-34: 
II.12; Gödel, 1953-54?: fn.34, p.203: Nesher, 1987, 2002: V)? (2) Can G1 be meaningful and “contentually 
true” that eventually represents a mathematical true fact (Gödel, 1931a: 203)?  
 If G1: “I am unprovable” is proved formally true in PM, then its claim of being unprovable is false 
because it was proved true [in PM] and cannot be unprovable, but when G1 is false then being unprovable 
in PM is true as it claims, and thus presenting a paradox like the liar paradox, and Gödel’s trick of using a 
kind of paradoxical argument fails. 
 
The analogy of this argument with the Richard antinomy leaps to the eye. It is closely related to the 
“Liar” too.14 (Any epistemological antinomy could be used for a similar proof of the existence of 
undecidable propositions). (Gödel, 1931: 149) 
 Since any epistemological antinomy is void of truth, this means that its proof is also void of truth.  It 
seems that Gödel felt this difficulty, and his way out of this paradoxical situation is to locate the proof at the 
metamathematical arithmetical language and thus separate this formal proof from the language of G1 with 
the assuming truth of its bizarre meaning. 
 
From the remark that [R(q);q] says about itself that it is not provable, it follow at once that [R(q);q] 
is true, for [R(q);q] is indeed unprovable (being undecidable). Thus, the proposition that is 
undecidable in the system PM still was decided by metamathematical considerations.  
(Gödel, 1931: 151) 
 Why did Gödel take recourse in this “epistemological antinomy” as a trick and not proving the 
incompleteness of PM by showing that propositions “of the type of Goldbach or Fermat” are unprovable in 
it (Gödel1931a: 203)?  It seems that Gödel intended a general proof of the nature of all mathematical 
theories in respect of their infinite mathematical reality (Agazzi, 1974: 24). Gödel’s Platonist realism leads 
him to formulate his proof with the suffix able as his “provable” and “unprovable” terms. This means that 
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since there are eternal and infinite true mathematical facts that eventually can be grasped by pure intuition, 
they are either provable or unprovable in any mathematical theory (Hintikka, 2000:29).  In such Platonic 
epistemology, truth in reality and proof in theories are separated, which enables Gödel to separate the proof 
of G1 from the truth of the mathematical fact it is to represent, in order to avoid the paradox in proving his 
incomplete theorem of being “closely related to the ‘Liar.’”   
 
Finally it should be noted that the heuristic principle of my construction of undecidable number 
theoretical propositions in the formal systems of mathematics is the highly transfinite concept of 
‘objective mathematical truth’ as opposed to that of ‘demonstrability’ . . .  , with which it was 
generally confused before my own and Tarski’s work (Gödel in a letter to Wang, Dec. 7, 1967, in 
Wang, 1974: 9; Feferman, 1984: 106-107; Franzn, 2005: 2.4). 
 Hence, Gödel leans on the distinction between the liar proposition P
L: “I am lying” and the 
unprovable proposition P
U: “I am unprovable” since in the former we reach the liar paradox that if it is true 
then it is false and vice versa, whereas there is no such paradox of truth and falsity in the latter, since proof 
and truth are separated (Gödel, 1934 #7, 1951: 322-323; Hintikka, 2000:35-36; Devlin, 2002).   
 
So we can see that the class  of numbers of true formulas cannot be expressed by the propositional 
function of our system, whereas the class  of provable formulas can. Hence    and if we assume 
   (i.e., every provable formula is true) we have   , i.e., there is a proposition A which is true 
but not provable.  A then is not true and therefore not provable either, i.e., A is undecidable (Gödel, 
1934: 363). 
 Generally, Gödel separates the truth of mathematical facts, which can be grasped intuitively, from 
the formal proof of propositions in mathematical theories and thus also, he can separate the attempted 
formal proof of G1 from its seemingly representing the truth of a fact in the mathematical reality of PM.  
Leaning on his Platonistic realism he could do it in order to avoid the possibility that G1 would be both true 
and false like the Tarskian liar proposition.  
 
Thus if truth for number theory were definable within itself, one could find a precise version of the 
liar statement, giving a contradiction. It follows that truth is not so definable. But provability in the 
system is definable, so the notions of provability and truth must be distinct. In particular if all 
provable sentences are true, there must be true non-provable sentences.  The self-referential 
construction applied to provability (which is definable) instead of truth, then leads to a specific 
example of an undecidable sentence (Feferman, 1984: 106). 
 However, if the notions of truth and proof are not separated there are no “true non-provable 
sentences” and “the self-referential construction” of G1 leads to an “epistemological antinomy,” a kind of 
the liar paradox.  Metaphysical realists, such as Platonists and formal semanticists (e.g., Tarski), assume 
that truth is independent of proof and, by the bivalence of truth values, the principle of excluded middle, 
identify truth with reality, yet, not for complete formal systems (Gödel, 1929: 63; Penrose, 2011: 342-343).  
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Pragmaticists, however, show that for humans the truth and falsity of propositions consist only of that 
which we have already proved as such, since we cannot know truth from a Godly perspective (Nesher, 
2002: V). Since there is no separation between truth and being proved, then we have to drop the expressions 
“provable” and “unprovable” from our epistemology. This terminology belongs to Metaphysical Realism, 
such as Gödel’s Conceptual Realism, Popper’s absolute truth, among others, in distinction from 
Pragmaticist Representational Realism (Nesher, 2002: III, V, VIII).  
Therefore, without being proved true or false, propositions remain doubtful, and since no one has 
proved the truth or the falsity of the liar proposition, it is doubtful and there cannot be any paradox (Nesher, 
2002: V).  Hence the separation of truth from proof is epistemologically untenable and so also the 
separation between the liar paradox and the unprovable-provable antinomy, and thus, with the doubtful 
unprovable proposition we cannot prove anything (Hintikka, 2000:31-35).  Although Wittgenstein sensed 
the paradoxical difficulty in Gödel’s alleged proof of incompleteness, he could not explain it without having 
an epistemology of truth (Wittgenstein, 1937; Nesher, 1992; Floyd and Putnam, 2000; Floyd, 2001; Berto, 
2009: # 9).  
 
How can Gödel prove that his crucial proposition is not logically provable by using the very same 
logic? And how we can know that the proposition in question is true if we cannot prove it? 
(Hintikka, 2000:29)  
 What, then, is the meaning of G1 if it were proved to represent a conceptual true fact in 
mathematical reality? And can we specify this true fact that the alleged meaning-content of G1 represents?  
Indeed, there is no mathematical fact that G1 represents, since it is not a proposition with real subject matter 
and clear content and if anything at all, it has only a shadowing meaning (Gödel, 1931a: 203; Weyl, 1949: 
51; Feferman, 1984: 106).  However, if G1: “G1 is unprovable” is void of real meaning and thus cannot be 
“contentually true” then it cannot represent any intended “mathematical objects or facts exist,” according to 
Gödel’s criticism of the syntactic conception of mathematics (Gödel, 1931a: 203, Gödel, 1953-54?: #30; 
Agazzi, 1974: 24; Feferman, 1984: 103).  Hence the arithmeticized proof of G1 is only mechanically 
connected to the object language and has nothing to do with its meaning (Tarski, 1944; Nesher, 1987, 2002: 
V; Floyd, 2001: III).  Then if G1 can be proved formally, any sentence can be proved emptily and the 
system or theory in which it is proved is inconsistent (Gödel 1931a: 203).  
 
This formulation of the non-feasibility of the syntactic program (which also applies to finitary 
mathematics) is particularly well suited for elucidating the question as to whether mathematics is 
void of content [in the sense that no mathematical objects or facts exist]. For, if prima facie content 
of mathematics were only a wrong appearance, it would have to be possible to build up mathematics 
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satisfactorily without making use of this “pseudo” content. (Gödel, 1953-54?: #30; Hintikka, 2000: 
29) 
 However, the meaning-contents of scientific theories are based on our experiential confrontation 
with external reality and mathematical reality, as well. Thus, the basic facts of mathematical reality cannot 
be proved formally in theory from its axioms and the question is how we prove their truths and whether we 
can grasp their truths by pure mathematical intuition (Gödel, 1944: 21). 
 
It is turned out that (under the assumption that modern mathematics is consistent) the solution of 
certain arithmetical problems requires the use of assumptions essentially transcending arithmetic, 
i.e., the domain of the kind of elementary indisputable evidence that may be most fittingly compared 
with sense perception. (Gödel, 1944: 121; cf. Gödel, 1953: #34) 
 This Gödel insight fits the pragmaticist understanding of the role of epistemic logic proofs in all 
empirical sciences, mathematics included (Gödel, 1947: 182-183, 1964: 268-269; Nesher, 2002, 2007; 
Chihara, 1982).  The central problem in the epistemology of mathematical theories concerns an explanation 
of mathematical reality: What is it and how do we prove the propositional facts of mathematics (Kitcher, 
1984; Nesher, 2002: X)? Since this reality cannot be known by any axiomatic mathematical theory, there 
may be other methods to know it, such as Gödel’s mathematical intuition grasping mathematical true facts, 
or rather the epistemic logic we operate to quasi-prove the truth of our perceptual judgments representing 
mathematical reality (Agazzi, 1974: 24). 
 
(Assuming the consistency of classical mathematics) one can even give examples of propositions 
(and in fact of those type of Goldbach or Fermat) that, while contentually true, are unprovable in the 
formal system of classical mathematics. Therefore, if one adjoins the negation of such a proposition 
to the axioms of classical mathematics, one obtains a consistent system in which a contentually false 
proposition is provable.  . . .  (Gödel 1931a: 203). 
 The discrepancy between Gödel’s intuition about the realistic nature of mathematics and his attempt 
to prove propositional facts formally can be resolved by the Peircean epistemic logic of complete proofs.  
Through it, we can prove the truth of the basic propositional facts of mathematics, discover hypothetical 
axioms, and evaluate their truth upon the true facts of mathematical reality.  
 The question is, why nevertheless did Gödel’s formal proof of the incompleteness of mathematical 
theories were accepted almost without questioning the problematic “epistemological antinomy?”  It may be 
that the generation of Frege and Hilbert, and the next one, were captivated by the deductivist-formalist 
agenda and the analytic formal semantic epistemology with the metalanguages hierarchies, which could not 
seriously reevaluate this proof (Dawson, 1984). Since the realistic conception of mathematics expresses 
mathematicians’ intuition about their work, then what Gödel offered about the incompleteness of 
mathematical theories is accepted naturally: i.e., that there are “contentually true” propositions in the 
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language of theory that cannot be proved except by extended axiomatic theories (Hintikka, 2000: V). 
 
           5. The Pragmaticist Epistemology of Cognitive Empirical Representations of External Reality 
 The deviation of formal systems from human working with mathematical theories can be explained 
by suggesting that formal systems are only realistic theories in disguise or utopian; i.e., impossibly "ideal 
machines" of different degrees (Dawson, 1984:79; Nesher, 2001b). 
 
By the turn of this century mathematics, 'the paradigm of certainty and truth', seemed to be the real 
stronghold of orthodox Euclideans. But there are certainly some flaws in the Euclidean organization 
even of mathematics, and these flaws caused considerable unrest.  Thus the central problem of all 
foundational schools was: 'to establish once and for all the certitude of mathematical methods'. 
1
 (
1
 
Hilbert, 1925).  However, foundational studies unexpectedly led to the conclusion that a Euclidean 
reorganization of mathematics as a whole may be impossible; that at least the richest mathematical 
theories were, like scientific theories, quasi-empirical. Euclideanism suffered a defeat in its very 
stronghold (Lakatos, 1978: 30). 
The formal systems with their formal proofs, though aiming to increase the power of formal 
computations, yet as far as they estranged from human cognitive operations representing reality their 
efficiency is decreased. The advantage of human cognitive operations lies in its having self-consciousness 
and self-control in confronting the mathematical, physical, and other realities, which enable correcting 
errors and evolving human knowledge (Gödel, 1972a: 305-6; Nesher, 1990, 1999; Hintikka, 1997: 5.7, 
2000: X; Putnam, 2011: 15.4).  In this perspective, we can understand the epistemology of the “Exact 
Sciences,” the issue of the Königsberg Conference in September 1930, in which Gödel announced his 
discovery of incompleteness; namely, that even mathematics is not pure science and is only relatively exact 
(Nesher, 2002: X). 
 
. . .  as far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are 
certain, they do not refer to reality. (Einstein, 1921) 
  Gödel’s incompleteness theorem is about the relativity of any mathematical theory in respect to its proof-
conditions in representing mathematical reality. 
 
There is in fact in the light of hindsight a major puzzle about Gödel’s insights and about the way he 
put them to use. One of his greatest achievements, arguably the greatest one, was to show the 
deductive incompleteness of elementary arithmetic. (Hintikka, 2005: 536)   
 Hintikka obscures the issue that the incompleteness of any scientific theory, including elementary 
arithmetic, is due not only to the incompleteness of formal deductive inferences; scientific theories with 
their complete epistemic logical proofs are also incomplete and are true only upon their specific proof-
conditions and therefore, they are incomplete in respect to reality we endeavor to represent.  Since all our 
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knowledge of reality is based on perceptual experience in confrontation with reality, so also is our 
mathematical experience in confrontation with its reality, which cannot comprise Platonist abstract objects. 
The distinction between completeness of axiomatic formal systems and the incompleteness of mathematical 
and other scientific theories is not logical but, rather, epistemological and can be proved with pragmaticist 
epistemic logic (Nesher, 2002, 2007; Wittgenstein, 1933-34: 296).  
 
The nontriviality of the proof of completeness for limpid logic must be forcefully presented the 
possibility to Platonist Gödel that there were propositions that are arithmetically true but not 
provable within a formal system of arithmetic. (Goldstein, 2005: 154) 
 Thus, Gödel’s “evident without proof” of true propositions that were not proved in specific formal 
systems, illustrates that cognitive confrontation with external reality cannot be formalized. According to 
Gödel the basic true mathematical facts can be grasped intuitively and from them the axioms are intuitively 
accepted as true without proofs.   
 
Of course, the task of axiomatizing mathematics proper differs from the usual conception of 
axiomatics insofar as the axioms are not arbitrary, but must be correct mathematical propositions, 
and moreover, evident without proof. There is no escaping the necessity of assuming some axioms 
or rules of inference as evident without proof, because the proofs must have some start point. 
(Gödel, 1951: 305). 
However, since there is no human truths without proofs this can be undertaken only by quasi-proofs 
of basic perceptual judgments representing reality in complete epistemic logic, the trio sequence of  the 
material logical inference of Abductive discovery, the Deductive necessary inference and  the material 
inference of Inductive evaluation (Nesher, 2002: V, X).  Hence, the impossibility of proving formally in 
metamathematics the theorem of unprovability is also due to the impossibility of proving formally the truth 
of propositional facts of external mathematical reality, “because the proofs must have some start point” and 
their proved truth is the “start point.”  This is hinted by Russell about the empirical assumptions of 
mathematics, and so Gödel, too, cannot prove G1 formally in an incomplete mathematical theory (Russell, 
1914; Nesher, 2002: V).  With the cognitive epistemic logic, we start from the quasi-proof of the basic 
perceptual facts of our knowledge of reality without any miraculous “given.”  Thus, we can discard the 
transcendental a priorism while all our knowledge is empirical (Nesher, 2007). 
 
 [3] The Entire Perceptual Operation: Complete Trio of Abduction, Deduction, and Induction: 
Abduction((C
Ab
(A
AbCAb)=>AAb)+Deduction((AC)Ab AAb)CDd)+Induction((AAb, CIn)>(AAbCIn)) 
Where: => is the Abductive  plausibility connective suggesting the concept A
Ab
,  is the Deductive 
necessity connective from which the abstract object C
Dd
 is inferred, and >  is the Inductive  probability 
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connective evaluating the relationship between the concept A
Ab
 and the new experiential object C
In 
, when 
C
In
 is similar to C
Dd
.  From this epistemological position, it is amazing that Gödel, by using pure intuition 
and thus admitting the limitation of formal proofs, nevertheless attempted to prove the incompleteness of 
mathematical theories by incomplete formal inference (Gödel, 1931: #1, 1951: 304-306; Dawson, 1984: #2; 
Hintikka, 2005: 536).   
Indeed, Lakatos and Putnam's conception of the quasi-empirical proofs in mathematics seem 
analogical to Gödel's mathematical proofs with intuitive grasps of true facts and his other intuitive 
inferences. Howevr, the Peircean epistemic logic of the trio inferences is the solution to the limitation of 
formal logic, yet not as the quasi-empirical method based on convention but empirically quasi-proving the 
truth of the basic propositions upon mathematical external reality. Thish is the only way to reach 
convention and for realism in human knowledge including mathematical knowledge (Lakatos, 1967[1978]: 
36; Putnam, 1975: 63-77). The Pragmaticist overcoming of Gödel’s Platonism is that all our knowledge 
develops from our sense-perception confrontation with external reality, and therefore conceptual realism 
with its pure intuition is only disguised empirical knowledge of reality.  Since for Gödel mathematical 
reality consists of abstract entities, the analogy with empirical sciences is incomplete. The following is a 
schema of perceptual quasi-proof of perceptual judgment representing external reality (cf. [3]): 
 
 [4] Perceptual Experience of Interpreting Cognitive Signs in Representing Physical Objects: 
Quasi-proof of the Truth of Perceptual Judgment 
 
         I n t e r p r e t a t i o n relations evolve hierarchically 
      From Pre-verbal Sensorimotor Signs  to Propositional Judgment 
 Interpretational relations 
 Percept-Sign Iconic Presenting Indexical Operating Symbol: Perceptual Judgment 
         Object Shapes    Immediate Object   Concept of Object 
       Feeling  Reaction    Thought     
        \         Iconic     Indexical    The  
    Replicas     Feeling    Reaction      Meaning-Content of 
                    \          \         Iconic           Symbol-Concept 
               \           \          Feeling       
     
                            \      \                     
                                                                           
         Represented   Real   Physical   Object   
 The signs representing a Real Object constitute the Iconic Feeling of Object Shapes, the Indexical 
reaction to it being the Immediate Object pre-symbolic representation, and their synthesis in the Symbolic 
Concept represents the Real Object by the true Perceptual Judgment.  Recognizing that our knowledge 
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starts from perceptual confrontation with reality, we can understand Gödel’s problem with grasping ideal 
entities through pure intuition, like the Kantian Intellectual Intuition in grasping supersensible objects, 
which only a supernatural being can do (Gödel, 1951; Dummett, 1981: 251-252).  It is upon such basic 
knowledge that all our theories develop through the discovery of hypotheses (Nesher, 2008). 
  
But despite their remoteness from sense-experience, we do have something like a perception of the 
objects of set theory, as it seems from the fact that the axioms force themselves upon us as being 
true. I don’t see any reason why we should have less confidence in this kind of perception, i.e., in 
mathematical intuition, than in sense-perception, which induces us to build up physical theories and 
to expect that future sense perceptions will agree with them, and, moreover, to believe that a 
question not decidable now has meaning and may be decided in the future. (Gödel, 1964: 268; 
emphasis added; Weyl, 1949: 235)  
 We can compare this feeling of force to Frege’s feeling the force of truth in indicative sentences: 
 
We declare the recognition of truth in the form of an indicative sentence. We do not have to use the 
word “true” for this. And even when we do use it, the real assertive force lies not in it but in the 
form of the indicative sentence, and where this loses its assertive force the word “truth” cannot put it 
back again. (Frege, 1918: 89-90, emphasis added; cf. Nesher, 2002: VI.5.)  
 Such a feeling of the force of truth is the feeling of the self-controlled perceptual quasi-proofs of our 
perceptual judgments, and “the fact that the axioms force themselves upon us” is the feeling of the 
Abductive discovery and Inductive evaluation of the axioms as hypotheses, through the instinctive, practical 
and rational operation of epistemic logic. Thus, mathematical theories are also based on perceptual 
experience confronting its external reality. The question is how mathematical reality differs from physical 
reality (Putnam. 1975: #4, 1994: # 12).  
 
           6.  What, Therefore, Is the Mathematical Reality That Mathematical Theories Represent? 
  Since all our knowledge of reality is based on perception and introspection, then basic mathematical 
knowledge is also based on such experiences (Wang, 1974: VII.3; Nesher, 2002: III).  The basic 
Mathematical reality that we initially represent consists of our operations of counting, grouping, and 
measuring physical objects when confronting our environment (Nesher, 1990, 2002: V, 2007).  
  
. . . the primitive man could count only by pointing to the objects counted, one by one. Here the 
object is all-important, as was the case with early measures of all peoples. The habit is seen in the 
use of such units as the foot, ell (elbow), thumb (the basis for our inch), hand, span, barleycorn, and 
furlong (furrow long). In due time such terms lost their primitive meaning and we think of them as 
abstract measures. In the same way the primitive words used in counting were at first tied to 
concrete groups, but after thousands of years they entered the abstract stage in which the group 
almost ceases to be a factor. (Smith, 1923: 7)   
 Hence, arithmetic and geometry were historically basic human modes of quantitative operations on 
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physical objects. With our sensual perception, we represent these operations, yet not the engaged physical 
objects and not the involved conceptual number signs, but their combination in these operations themselves. 
Hence, the perceptual representation of these operations, being our basic representation of mathematical 
reality, is “a kind of visual justification which the Egyptian employed” (Gittleman, 1975: 8, 27-31; Parsons, 
1995: 61). The arithmetical numbers are neither physical objects nor abstract concepts, but the conceptual 
components of our quantitative operations with physical objects. We assign numbers to these intentional 
cognitive operations cum physical maneuvers as signs of these operations. The discovery of the first 
concepts of these operations of enumeration consist of natural numbers; and the further discovering of their 
expansion through abstractions and generalizations constitutes our new mathematical hypotheses, which 
will be evaluated upon the extended mathematical reality (Gödel, 1944:128, 1964:268; Martin, 2005: 207; 
Spinoza, 1663).   
 
But consider a physical law, e.g., Newton's Law of Universal Gravitation. To say that this law is true 
. . .  one has to quantify over such non-nominalistic entities as forces, masses, distances. Moreover, 
as I tried to show in my book, to account for what is usually called 'measurement' – that is, for the 
numericalization of forces, masses, and distances – one has to quantify not just over forces, masses, 
and distances construed as physical properties . . . , but also over functions from masses, distances 
etc. to real numbers, or at any rate to rational numbers. In short –  and this is the insight that, in 
essence, Frege and Russell already had – a reasonable interpretation of the application of 
mathematics to the physical world requires a realistic interpretation of mathematics. (Putnam, 1975: 
74)     
 
The realistic understanding of mathematics that I suggest here is that mathematical reality is not an 
interpretation in the physical reality the physical sciences represent but it is the human operations of 
counting, groping, and measuring physical objects and their relations, being the basic mathematical reality 
upon its true representation the mathematical abstract and generalized theories are developed (Putnam, 
1975: 77-78; Weyl, 1949: 235).   
These basic operations are known by their perceptual representations; however, when we abstract, 
generalize, and further recombine the arithmetical components of these operations with our intellectual 
intuition, we continue to self-control them perceptually. Although the new mathematical structures are 
based on our perceptual confrontation with the reality of operations, when we elaborate them into more 
complicated kinds of mathematical structures they seemed detached from their reality as abstract conceptual 
entities grasped by pure intuition. Actually they are evolving in hierarchical relations between sense-
perception and intellectual intuitions in our knowledge of mathematical reality without this reality being 
divided into “two separate worlds (the world of things and the world of concepts”) (Gödel, 1951: 321). 
 
On the other hand, we have a debate between Realism—mathematical things exist objectively, 
independently of our mathematical activity—and Constructivism—mathematical things are created 
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by our mathematical activity. We want to know how much of this can be regarded as continuous 
with the practice itself. (Maddy, 1997: 191)  
 The question is about the relationship of our mathematical activity with mathematical structures 
such that if they are external mathematical reality how we know them, and if they are our constructions, 
how can we apply them in our empirical theories (Heyting, 1931: 52-53; Dedekind, 1901:15-16)?  The 
solution to this predicament between Metaphysical Realism and Phenomenological Constructivism is that 
mathematical reality exists objectively, yet not independently of our mathematical activity.  Mathematical 
reality is our intentional self-controlled mathematical operations on physical objects, such as 1 apple and 1 
apple are 2 apples, which are connected with our perceptual representation of this operation as a certain 
behavioral reality.  Hence, we perceptually quasi-prove the truth of our perceptual judgment that “1 + 1 = 
2,” representing a mathematical operation, and thereby discover the structures of arithmetical numerical 
signs. Then, by discovering and proving the true representation of new mathematical operations, we 
hypothesize general theories, such as Peano’s Arithmetic; finally, by evaluating them, we extend our 
knowledge of mathematical reality (Smith, P., 2007: #28.3).  In this way we discover the construct of 
mathematical theories although the Constructivists consider the theories themselves as mathematical reality 
and not as representations of mathematical operations reality (Resnik, 1997). Hence, only by quasi-proving 
the truth of perceptual facts representing mathematical operations do we represent mathematical reality. 
 
 [5] The Double Layer of Mathematical Operations: (1) Counting Physical Objects; (2) 
Perceptual Quasi-proving the Truth of Discovering the Numerical Signs of the 
Operation (Peirce, 7.547) 
 
 I n t e r p r e t a t i o n Relations evolve From Pre-verbal Signs to Propositional Judgment 
 
 The Cognitive Representation of Mathematical Reality: Discovering and Operating Numerical Signs  
     Reflective Interpretational Relations 
 
 (2) Percept-SignIconic PresentingIndexical OperatingSymbolic Notion: Perceptual Judgment  
                  Object Shapes             Immediate Object    Representing Reality     Numerical Counting  
        
 (1) Human Self-Controlling of Numerical Operations of Counting and Measuring Physical Objects 
    Mathematical Reality 
 
 
 Gödel considers abstract mathematical theories analogous to physical theories such that 
mathematical axiomatic theories representation of mathematical abstract reality precedes their application 
to the empirical world but it is not the reality of human mathematical operations themselves on physical 
objects:  
“. . . the applications of mathematics to the empirical world, which formerly were based on the 
intuitive truth of the mathematical axioms,  . . .” (Gödel, 1953:#12) 
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In contrast to Gödel's role of intuition to grasp the truth of mathematical abstract facts, we can 
perceptually prove the truth of propositional facts representing the reality of mathematical operations 
(Wittgenstein, 1956: III, 44).  By understanding that mathematical reality consists of perceptually self-
controlled operations, we can see how Gödel confuses the meaning-contents of mathematical symbols, 
which are the immediate modes representing numerical operations, with his Platonist mathematical 
abstract objects. These immediate modes of representation are the Peircean indexical representations of 
real objects which in mathematics are the factual operations of mathematical reality.  Here we can discern 
Gödel’s close insight of Peirce's conception of the perceptual “immediate object” component of symbols 
representing mathematical reality (Peirce, CP: 8.183, 8.343 [1908]; Nesher, 2002: II). 
 
It should be noted that mathematical intuition need not be conceived of as a faculty giving an 
immediate knowledge of the objects concerned. Rather it seems that, as in the case of physical 
experience, we form our ideas also of those objects on the basis of something else which is 
immediately given. Only this something else here is not or not primarily, the sensations. That 
something beside the sensations actually is immediately given follows (independently of 
mathematics) from the fact that even our ideas referring to physical objects contain constituents 
qualitatively different from sensations or mere combinations of sensations, e.g., the idea of object 
itself, whereas, on the other hand, by our thinking we cannot create any qualitatively new 
elements, but only | reproduce and combine those that are given. Evidently the “given” 
underlying mathematics is closely related to the abstract elements contained in our empirical 
ideas. It by no means follows, however, that the data of this second kind, because they cannot be 
associated with actions of certain things upon our sense organs, are something purely subjective, 
as Kant asserted. Rather they, too, may represent an aspect of objective reality, but, as opposed to 
the sensations, their presence in us may be due to another kind of relationship between ourselves 
and reality. (Gödel, 1964: 268)   
 
 Here Gödel’s distinction between sensual perceptions and mathematical intuitions of the reality of 
abstract mathematical objects is the Pragmaticist distinction between the immediate iconic-sensual sign 
and the indexical-reaction being the “immediate object,” the “abstract element” which is only the sign 
representing the real object. This Gödel's distinction is based on a confused epistemology that replaces 
the meaning-contents of such mathematical propositions with the external reality they represent (Gödel, 
1953/54?: #35).  It is Peirce’s conception of the cognitive “immediate object,” representing the real object 
that Descartes calls “objective reality” in distinction from “formal reality,” the real object, without being 
able to explain it as perceptual cognitive representation of external reality (e.g., Peirce, CP: 8.183, 8.343; 
Nesher, 2002: II, III, V; Feferman, 1998; Parsons, 2008: Chap. 6).  The following is a schema of a 
mathematical reality operation represented by the perceptual immediate object as the meaning-content of 
the symbolic sign of mathematics: 
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 [6]   Perceptual Representation of the Cognitive Operation of Counting Physical Objects by 
Quasi-proving the Truth of Its Perceptual Judgment of Mathematical Operation   
    I n t e r p r e t a t i o n relations evolve From Pre-verbal Signs to Propositional Judgment 
The Cognitive Representation of Mathematical Reality: Discovering and Operating Numerical Signs  
      Reflective Interpretational Relations 
 Percept-SignIconic PresentingIndexical OperatingSymbolic Sign:  Perceptual Judgment of   
       Feeling     Reaction        Thought      Counting: “2 & 2 are 4"  
           Objects Shapes         Immediate Object       Represent Objects   
       \                Iconic   Indexical     The  
       \   Replicas     Feeling    Reaction       Meaning-Content of 
         \                    \           Iconic            Symbol-Concept 
           \                       \            Feeling                   
             \                        \   \             Relation of 
                                                                          Representation 
 
 Human Self-Controlling of Numerical Operations of Counting and Measuring Physical Objects 
    Mathematical Reality 
 
 An echo of this explanation is noticed in Gödel’s insight into the realist nature of mathematics: 
. . . [mathematics] in its simplest form, when the axiomatic method is applied, not to some 
hypothetico-deductive system as geometry (where the mathematician can assert only the 
conditional truth of the theorems), but mathematical proper, that is, to the body of those 
mathematical propositions, which hold in an absolute sense, without any further hypothesis. 
There must exist propositions of this kind, because otherwise there could not exist any 
hypothetical theorems | either. For example, some implications of the form: 
 
If such and such axioms are assumed, then such and such theorems hold, must necessarily 
be true in the absolute sense. Similarly, any theorem of finitistic number theory, such as  
2 + 2 = 4, is no doubt, of this kind. (Gödel, 1951: 305; cf. 322)   
  
 The perceptual representation of basic mathematical operations is the quasi-proved true empirical 
facts of mathematical reality, but not an ideal one.  Yet this seems to be an unbridgeable gap for Penrose. 
. . .  real numbers are called ‘real’ because they seem to provide the magnitudes needed for the 
measurement of distance, angle, time, energy, temperature, or of numerous other geometrical and 
physical quantities. However, the relationship between the abstractly defined ‘real’ numbers and 
the physical quantities is not as clear-cut as one might imagine. Real numbers refer to 
mathematical idealization rather than to any actual physically objective quantity. (Penrose, 1989: 
112-113; cf.  Penrose, 2011: 16:1) 
 
Hence, Popper’s amazement as to why mathematics can be applicable to reality is resolved by 
explaining that mathematics indeed originated in human perceptual true representations of mathematical 
reality, the “empirical basis” of mathematical theory being more abstract component of this empirical 
science (Popper, 1963: #9; Dedekind, 1901: 17; Poincare, 1902: Author's Preface, Chap. II).  
 
7.  Mathematics Is an Empirical Science Based on True Propositional Facts of Mathematical Reality 
 
 Hence the problem is to explain the nature of mathematical science and what are the “data,” the 
basic facts upon them the mathematical theories develop and evaluated? 
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. . .  mathematics has always presented itself, throughout the history, as an abstract discipline, but 
has nevertheless always dealt with specific subject matter of its own. Considering mathematics in 
this light one might ask: what kind of knowledge can be attained through it? How can it be said to 
deal with contents and objects which are offered as 'data,' and yet are not data at all from the point 
of view of sensible experience?  We are here confronted with the problem of mathematical 
intuition, considered as a real source of knowledge, to be clearly distinguished from that further 
form of mathematical activity which consists in the systematic construction of various theories. 
Indeed, the most delicate point of this problem is precisely the comparison between the intuitive 
moment and the moment of theoretical construction, since it is impossible to deny that, in many 
cases at least, mathematical theories are in fact an exact and systematic codification of what is 
known intuitively, and that, on the other hand, intuition is not sufficiently reliable unless it is 
supported by logical proof (Agazzi, 1974: 9-10). 
 The formal logical proof cannot support or replace the intuitive grasp of the mathematical basic 
true fact in Gödelian Platonism, and only the epistemic logic of Peircean trio can quasi-prove the truth of 
the perceptual judgments as the basic mathematical propositional facts (Nesher, 2002: X).  Only this logic 
can replace the mysterious unexplainable intuition of mathematical facts and can prove mathematical 
truths by the epistemic complete proof.  Thus it also replaces the assuming roles of such intuition for 
discovery and evaluation of the axioms of mathematical theories (Agazzi, 1974: 12).   
 From the quasi-proof of the truth of the basic mathematical propositional facts of mathematical 
reality, the mathematical hypotheses are Abductively discovered to infer Deductively their predicted 
theorems and evaluated Inductively upon empirically newly discovered and proved mathematical facts. 
The following is a pragmaticist epistemological explanation of the general structure and operation of the 
theories of mathematical empirical science: 
 
  [7] Pragmaticist Epistemological Presentation of Mathematical Empirical Theory: 
  
           Empirical Theory 
         //|\\ 
                   The Hypothesis   ////\\\\  
              //////\\\\\  
            /       |      \ 
                       / Deductive\ 
            /     Formal     \     
                          /     Inference      \   
  Abductive         /                         \       
   Discovery /    The Conclusions    \       Inductive   
              ______________________   Evaluation 
                                /  Q u a s i–P r o v e d      \ 
                    /  T r u e Propositional Facts  \    
          /       of Mathematical Reality    \  
                     __________________________
 /    O p e r a t i o n s of counting,      \     
/ grouping, and measuring structures  \  
                                          /and motions of components of Nature: \                        
            /    Mathematical External Reality     \    
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The proof-conditions of mathematical empirical theory are the epistemic logic, the trio 
comprising inferential rules of the complete proof of the truth of basic propositional facts representing 
external reality. With this epistemic logic we also prove the truth of scientific hypotheses (Gödel's 
axioms), through their Abductive discovery, Deductive formally inferred theorems and their Inductive 
evaluation upon the basic propositional facts. Yet, Gödel's conception of mathematical intuition covers 
those different components of the Pragmaticist epistemic logic which though he felt their operations but 
could not explain the truth of these basic propositional facts of mathematical reality and the truth of the 
axioms which the epistemic logical complete proof can do (Feferman, 1998: #1; Parsons, 2008: #5). 
Hence, empirical theories are only relatively true by being “closed” upon their proof-conditions, which 
can change with newly discovered facts of reality (Heisenberg, 1971:43-44; Nesher, 2002: V.5, X.10).  
 
Yet if mathematical facts are facts, they must be facts about something; if mathematical truths 
are true, something must make them true. Thus arises the first important question: what is 
mathematics about? If 2 plus 2 is so definitely 4, what is it that makes it so? (Maddy, 1990:1)    
 Although mathematical theory is about mathematical operations of counting, grouping, measuring, 
and so on, the question is, how do we prove the mathematical facts representing such operations; i.e., 
“what is it that makes it so” that 2 plus 2 are definitely 4?  We operate in such a manner that we count 
with our indexical ostensions while representing this operation in our perceptual judgment as a true fact of 
such arithmetical counting. Since all our basic knowledge comprises such quasi-proofs of our perceptual 
judgments, so too do the truths of our basic mathematical facts represent such operations of mathematical 
reality (comp. Hempel, 1945).  
 Indeed, we do not create on our will the patterns of mathematical reality, but we discover the 
mathematical concepts of our counting, grouping, and measuring operations with physical objects in the 
operations of mathematical reality, and this is “[mathematics] in its simplest form,  . . . mathematical 
proper, that is, to the body of those mathematical propositions, which hold in an absolute sense, without 
any further hypothesis” (Gödel, 1951: 305; Dedekind, 1901:15-16).  Epistemologically we can understand 
that when we intuit the force of the truth of our basic mathematical propositions we feel that they “hold in 
an absolute sense” but without conceiving the epistemic logic we cannot explain them as our own 
empirically quasi-proved true mathematical propositions (Steiner, 2000: 337-339).  
 
Namely, it is correct that a mathematical proposition says nothing about the physical or psychical 
reality existing in space and time, because it is true already owing to the meaning of the terms 
occurring in it, irrespectively of the world of real things (Gödel, 1951: 320).    
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 Yet Gödel is right that mathematical reality consists of neither physical nor psychical realities but 
it is the specific connection between them; namely, the mathematical “world of real things” is our 
cognitive operations of quantifying components of physical reality, and the meaning-contents of 
mathematical signs evolve in this perceptual experience (Wittgenstein, 1956: III, 44; Benacerraf, 1973; 
Tait, 1986; Resnik, 1992: #1; Martine, 2005: 210). 
 
To mention another example, the Pitta-Pitta, a tribe [of aborigines] in Queensland, are able to 
count the fingers and toes without a system of numerals, but only by the aid of marks in the sand. 
. .  (Smith, D., 1923: 7; Gullberg, 1997: Ch. 4).  
 This is evidence of arithmetical facts that are iconic cum indexical sensori-motoric operations of 
counting and grouping with pre-conceptual signs of properties and relations that eventually develop into 
conceptual components, the numerical symbols involving in mathematical facts (Gödel, 1951: 320).  
 
From its earliest beginnings science has used mathematics. Counting, measuring, ordering, and 
estimating are basic mental operations necessary for science as well as for many other human 
activities, and their nature is mathematical (Bos, 1993: 165). 
 Hence, mathematics, from “the ubiquitous use of elementary mathematics” to “the great variety of 
high level applications of mathematics” (Bos, 1993: 165-166), is an empirical science of the operational 
quantification of physical components of nature. Its development is from the use of elementary to the 
variety of high level mathematics evolved from the elaboration of abstract mathematical theories related 
to their advance applications by scientists working toward the advancement of scientific theories. 
 
              8.   Conclusion: Mathematics Is an Empirical Science Representing Its Own Reality, Being Neither 
Queen Nor Servant of Other Empirical Sciences but Their Quantitative Backbone 
  The problem is to explain the difference between mathematical science and other sciences and 
their collaboration, when all are empirical sciences representing different realities and with different roles 
in developing our knowledge of nature (Wang, 1974: VII). Thus, in mathematics we cannot have true 
theories without proving them upon mathematical reality.  Mathematicians develop their theories by 
discovering general hypotheses as mathematical formulations of theoretical models, typically of physics, 
like of fields of forces and topology of fluid flows, but of all other sciences, and evaluate them upon 
mathematical reality of quantitative operations on predicted physical observations. 
 
The rich interplay between mathematics and physics predates even their recognition as separate 
subjects.  The mathematical work that in some sense straddles the boundaries between the two is 
commonly referred to as mathematical physics, though a precise definition is probably 
impossible.  (Jaffe & Quinn, 1993: 4) 
 Mathematical theories formularize models for theoretical physical hypotheses, but there is a 
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distinction between proving the truth of mathematical theories and proving the truth of the relevant 
physical theories themselves (Feferman, 1998). 
 
Fore as far as verifiable consequences of theories are concerned the mathematical axioms are 
exactly as necessary for obtaining them as the laws of nature (cnf. footn. 41).  If, e.g., the 
impredicative axioms of analysis are necessary for the solution of some problem of mathematical 
physics, these axioms will imply predictions about observable facts not obtainable without them. 
Moreover it is perfectly conceivable that an inconsistency with observation may be due to not to 
some wrong physical assumptions but to an inconsistency of these axioms. (Gödel, 1953-54 II: 
#44, p. 188) 
That it is arbitrary to call mathematics void of content because, without laws of nature, it has no 
verifiable consequences also appears from the fact that the same is true for the laws of nature 
without mathematics or logic. cf. also #44. (Gödel, 1953-54 II: fn. 41, p. 207) 
Thus, physicists and mathematicians have different realities to represent with their theories, and 
the mathematical theory which proved true in the measurement of observed physical facts is only the 
condition for the evaluation of physical theories. Thus, in distinction from Gödel's conceptual 
epistemology of mathematics, according to the above explanation, the mathematical reality is also 
empirical.  The truth of mathematical theory enables proving experimentally the truth but also the falsity 
of physical theories.  In this way, we can understand the Gödelian epistemic intuition about the nature of 
mathematical theories, yet not the Quinean “mathematical naturalism,” which confuses mathematics with 
other sciences and identifies mathematical reality with physical reality.  
 When there are difficulties with a physical picture of reality and the mathematical model for it, 
such that it becomes impossible to make measurable predictions, then the problem is to inquire what is 
wrong that we are unable to evaluate experimentally the physical hypothesis (Woit, 2007: x-xiii, Ch. 14; 
Feferman, 1998: #2, #4). 
 
I can’t say whether string theory will ever get past its most serious hurdle–coming up with a 
testable prediction and then showing that the theory actually gives us the right answer.  (The 
math part of things, as I have said, is already on a much firmer ground.)  Nevertheless, I do 
believe the best chance for arriving at a successful theory lies in pooling the resources of 
mathematicians and physicists, combining the strengths of the two disciplines and their different 
ways of approaching the world. (Yau & Nadis, 2010: 304) 
 Hence, mathematics without operational measuring the predicted and eventually observed true 
facts of reality cannot be true and cannot be “on a much firmer ground” than physics without “a testable 
prediction.”  Both have to prove their own truths upon “their different ways of approaching the world.”  
 
However mathematical intuition in addition creates the conviction that, if these formulas express 
observable facts and were obtained by applying mathematics to verified physical laws (or if they 
express ascertainable mathematical facts), then these facts will be brought out by observation (or 
computation) (Gödel, 1953/9-III: #16; cf. ##13-15 & n. 34). 
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 How may one understand this hinted explication of the relationship between intuitive 
mathematical truth representing its own reality and its application to physical theories to enable 
observable predictions of them (Gödel, 1953II: #15)?  In the end, mathematics is neither the queen of 
science nor its servant but its quantitative backbone—that is, the quantified formulations of scientific 
theoretical models and their operations on scientific observations—without which physical and other 
theories cannot be evaluated experimentally (Bos, 1993: #10). The explanation to the puzzlement why 
mathematics is considered exact or pure science while being empirical like other experimental sciences, is 
the relative simplicity of its represented reality in respect to the physical and the psychological realities. 
Mathematics may be the queen of the science and therefore entitled to royal prerogatives, but the 
queen who loses touch with her subjects may lose support and even be deprived of her realm. 
Mathematicians may like to rise into the clouds of abstract thought, but they should, and indeed 
they must, return to earth for nourishing food or else die of mental starvation. They are on safer 
and saner ground when they stay close to nature. (Kline, 1959: 475) 
 This is a poetic metaphor that illustrates the above explanation of the empirical nature of 
mathematical reality, upon which mathematical theories can be evaluated and be proved true. This 
empirical explanation can be seen in Gödel’s late philosophical writings on the foundations of 
mathematics: 
 
If mathematics describes an objective world just like physics, there is no reason why inductive 
methods should not be applied in mathematics just the same as in physics.  . . .  This whole 
consideration incidentally shows that the philosophical implications of the mathematical facts 
explained do not lie entirely on the side of rationalistic or idealistic philosophy, but that in one 
respect they favor the empiricist viewpoint. It is true that only the second alternative points in 
this direction. (Gödel, 1951: 313)  
 Hence, we can know experientially the mathematical facts of the mathematical empirical reality. 
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